Group Parameters
50
2.0
1.0
Incentive Mechanisms
0.0
0.0
0
Agent Behavior
50%
0.10
Simulation Control
5 steps/frame
Agent Population
Participation Over Time
Group Size Effect
Payoff Distribution
Collective Action Outcome
INSUFFICIENT
0
Round
50.0
Participation (%)
0.00
Public Good Level
0
Contributors
Payoffs
0.00
Contributor Payoff
0.00
Free-Rider Payoff
0.00
Average Payoff
0.00
Social Welfare
Payoff Matrix
| Others Contribute | Others Defect | |
|---|---|---|
| Contribute | - | - |
| Defect | - | - |
Legend
Contributor
Free-Rider
Entrepreneur
Olson's Paradox:
Large groups are less likely to achieve collective action than small groups. Free-riding incentives increase with group size while individual impact decreases.
Large groups are less likely to achieve collective action than small groups. Free-riding incentives increase with group size while individual impact decreases.